Abstract In this paper, the authors demonstrate that the current crisis is based upon four different crises with different sources, which must all be solved in different ways. In addition to this, they highlight individual issues within individual European economies and in the current institutional set-up of the European Union. On the basis of this analysis they provide clear suggestions about what needs to be done to recover growth in Europe.
In the meantime, another financial crisis had pushed several banks to the edge of bankruptcy in southern Europe. Driven by low interest rates, an extensive growth of credit volume in Europe took place between 2001 and 2005 . This excessive liquidity was not represented in the Consumer Price Index but by the increased value of housing in southern Europe and in the stock market. The former created incentives to invest in the building sector in Mediterranean countries. For example, Spanish banks did not accumulate the incredible quantities of toxic assets linked to the US housing market as other banks in Europe did. But when the bubble burst, Spanish banks had to deal with a massive number of credit defaults in the building sector. These developments were recognised too late by the European Central Bank (ECB), which had set interest rates too low during its early years of existence. Under Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB started to increase the interest rate by small degrees in order to cool down the potential bubble, but the negative effects of the events in the US then took over in 2008.
The economic and social crisis
The accumulated risks on bank balance sheets due to toxic assets on the one hand, and to credit defaults in the Mediterranean building sector on the other, led to a situation where investors were searching for safe assets and banks would not lend money to each other. This credit crunch hit the real economy hard. Furthermore, aggregate demand decreased substantially. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates were negative in most European Member States in 2009 and 2010.
Not all Member States could find their way back to a path of growth.
Furthermore, political mismanagement, delayed reforms and necessary but not undertaken reforms had led to a significant loss of competitiveness in several Member States. Each country was struggling with its own situation, but in many cases reforms were necessary, especially with regard to the inefficient and inflated public sectors, social security schemes and labour markets. The urgent need for these reforms was hidden by low interest rates before the crisis, when states could still borrow money to refinance their debts. Another key problem within the euro area arose from the common interest rate of the ECB. Monetary policy was not able to react to individual situations when wages rose, particularly in the southern European countries.
This led to a serious loss of competitiveness. Germany successfully reformed its labour market and, thanks to the restraint of German trade unions before the crisis, Germany was able to regain its competitiveness. The reduction of the real unit labour cost in Germany prevented the increase of overall inflation in the eurozone that would have been caused by the wage increases in southern Europe. The nominal interest rates needed to increase in these countries with inflationary tendencies, but this was not possible under the common currency. A closer look at regional real interest rates before the crisis and now clearly shows unsustainable differences within the euro area.
Another important measure of the significant macroeconomic imbalances is the Target-II balances of the euro system, which indicate on the one hand the serious current account deficits, and on the other hand the amount of capital flight from certain states.
For some Member States there will be no alternative to painful internal devaluation in order to regain competitiveness. The relative price level in Greece, Portugal and Spain is too high if these countries want to find their way back to real growth. This reminds us of the need for closer coordination of financial and economic policies under the common currency.
Due to the combination of a lack of competitiveness, the credit crunch, high expenses for the public sector and a lack of reforms in the labour market and social security schemes, the real economy entered a deep and enduring recession in several countries. An immediate consequence of this was high unemployment. Due to lower income from taxation, governments were forced to cut spending, which worsened the situation for many people searching for work. Furthermore, health and education have been affected by the fiscal constraints that governments are now facing. This social dimension cannot and should not be ignored, but it is directly linked to the economic situation. Some European countries, partially due to the necessity of saving the banking sector and partially due to rampant fiscal mismanagement in recent decades, developed excessive national debts. The already timid financial actorsinfluenced by hardly objective US-based rating agencies-stopped lending to countries like Ireland, Greece, Italy and Spain, and interest rates reached a level that is no longer manageable, since the primary surplus now needs to be even higher to prevent a further increase in the debt burden. To break this vicious circle of indebtedness will be a major challenge. The primary surplus (being government income minus expenditures) needed to hold the debt-to-GDP ratio at least constant depends negatively on the GDP growth rate, but positively on the nominal interest rate for refinancing. If the latter variable is very high and the growth rate very low, as is the case in several countries, the primary surplus has to be consistently high to prevent a further increase of the debt ratio.
In the long run, one should consider the idea of a real European budget that could accommodate adequate reactions at the European level to adverse shocks. EU institutions must be rendered more effective, more visible and fully supportive of the principle of subsidiarity. We should step away from crisis management and return to the open legislative procedures of the Community method. We should also further increase the number of decisions taken via a qualified majority and reduce those taken by unanimity in the Council. In the long term, we need to think of giving new competences to the European level, particularly in the economic and financial fields.
Although we need to think about long-term developments, we do not believe that a discussion about treaty changes and the entire institutional set-up of the EU will help to stimulate growth and solve the crises described, since actions need to be taken now. Nevertheless, it is extremely important to make actions and decisions comprehensible. Agencies and institutions need to be reliable. 
Conclusion
We have presented our view on the four different but intertwined crises, and have suggested and commented on different policies for real and sustainable growth in Europe. It is clear that sustainable growth cannot be achieved through budgetary deficits. No fiscal stimulus would be able to relieve the need for structural reforms. Fiscal consolidation is a prerequisite for creating an investment-friendly environment for undertakings. Several Member States of the EU need to work hard on their competitive advantages so that the macroeconomic imbalances will decrease.
Each crisis has its own sources. Spillover effects have worsened the situation.
There is no general solution for growth. Hence each problem in each Member State needs to be tackled individually, but in coordination with other measures. Without the efforts of the Member States themselves, Europe will not find its way back to the path of growth. Despite the risk of aggravating the economic situation in the short term, tough reforms need to be implemented.
At the European level, measures exist to smooth this adjustment period and help Member States to return to growth more quickly.
Many actions for growth have already been implemented and important legislation is still on the way-at both European and national levels. It is time now to evaluate these policies and to ensure the strict and effective implementation of agreed-upon measures. Reliability at the European and national levels is the first step towards ensuring that the economy seems secure and ready for long-term investments. Peace, prosperity and stability have been the hallmarks of Europe. It is time for action and for commitment to the agreed-upon policies, in order to get Europe back on its pathway to growth.
